My research is primarily in philosophy of perception, social epistemology, and value questions in social epistemology. In these areas, I am interested in the normativity of perception, non-visual perception, action-based accounts of perception, social cognition, and the role of perception in our epistemology. I keep an active interest in Husserlian and contemporary phenomenology.

In perception, I have written on (and continue to explore) the idea that human perception is a type of socially constituted, direct interaction with the world. I am currently working in the role of context and background in perception and in the epistemological importance of the essentially perspectival nature of perception.

My current interests in social epistemology are about how sensory perception is at the basis of our interactions with others, and how this role helps us understand social relations based on visible identities, and contributes to understand the responsibilities we have towards each other. At the moment, I am working on the question of whether the perception of biological motion entails perception of minimal forms of intentionality and agency.  

I believe that students of philosophy can learn valuable lessons from philosophy classes, whether they are philosphy majors or not. I study and reflect on philosophy and pedagogy, and write on these topics as well.  

 

In the digital story What We See, right below, I remember and reconstruct some of the motivations that got me thinking about perception and sociality.


What We See

Like trees we grow – it’s hard to understand, like all life! – not in one place, but everywhere; not in one direction, but upwards and outwards and inwards and downwards equally; our energy drives trunk, branches, and roots all at once. — Nietzsche, The Gay Science

Nietzsche, The Gay Science