In my philosophical work, I study the social aspects of perception and the role of aspects and perspectives in all the sensory modalities (i.e. the different senses). I have written on (and continue to explore) the idea that human perception is a type of socially constituted, direct interaction with the world. This is a type of relationalism about perception that is best labeled as social enactivism about perception (SEP).

In social epistemology, I am interested in exploring how sensory perception underscores a good deal of our social interactions with others. At the moment, I am working on an article that looks at the problem of other minds through the lens of high-level perceptual properties. I am working also on an article that, taking into account that social identities partly appear to us perceptually, explores some epistemological implications of this perceptual aspect. 

In the digital story What We See, right below, I remember and reconstruct some of the motivations that got me to think about these topics.

What We See

Like trees we grow – it’s hard to understand, like all life! – not in one place, but everywhere; not in one direction, but upwards and outwards and inwards and downwards equally; our energy drives trunk, branches, and roots all at once. — Nietzsche, The Gay Science

Nietzsche, The Gay Science